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SCARCITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: HOW THE RESOURCE NEXUS 
AFFECTS MANAGEMENT 
 
 Since the advent of the 21st century and especially since the food and financial 
crisis in 2008, concerns about natural resource availability have resurfaced. While 
scarcity concerns date back hundreds of years and are foundational to economics, 
how scarcity is interpreted or framed has evolved significantly in the last two 
centuries. In this chapter, we recount the evolving scarcity discourse and specifically 
address the most recent iteration that centres on the idea of a resource nexus. While 
significant attention to the nexus has been paid by policy-makers and scholars 
interested in especially water, management scholars have so far remained absent 
from these debates.  
Given recent calls to address grand challenges in management and more 
specific calls for work on scarce natural resources, both this book and this chapter 
are timely endeavors (George et al., 2015). The munificence of the natural 
environment is an important issue for the well-being of mankind in general which 
affects the organization of the (post-) industrial economy. Various trends are 
suggestive of mounting resource needs that somehow need be met.  
Global population growth in combination with millions of people being lifted 
out of poverty following industrialization has increased pressure on natural 
ecosystems as demand for energy and water-intense food crops climbs. In 
conjunction with this trend, urbanization and violent conflict are driving mass 
migrations that challenge both natural systems and political institutions. While the 
human and social toll of violent conflict is evident, it is nonetheless important to 
recognize that for every person dying in armed conflict, about a 1,000 people die due 
to lack of access to clean water or as a consequence of household air pollution1. The 
decreasing ability of natural environments to function amidst on-going, unabated 
human interference is a contemporary, urgent problem. This reduced absorption 
capacity is a form of resource scarcity where we still lack important scientific 
understanding. As a consequence, governments have invested in security measures 
                                           
1 IEA (2016) numbers put the total number of deaths due to air pollution alone at 6.5 
million while the WHO estimated that almost 25% of deaths in 2012 (12.6 million) were due 
to unhealthy living environments (Lindmeier et al., 2016). 
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and hedges to scarcity, especially when it comes to food and energy independence, 
resulting in the phenomenon of land grabs as a form of foreign direct investments 
made by governments and sovereign wealth funds (ADB, 2013; Andrews-Speed et al., 
2012; Lee et al., 2012; Xynteo, 2012).  
The combination of these and other trends poses serious challenges for 
organizations that are directly or indirectly dependent on natural environments’ 
functioning. While challenges might be more pronounced for those organizations in 
the extractive industries, all organizations ought to ensure that their employees and 
community stakeholders can sustain themselves without experiencing undue harm 
caused by the organization’s operations. In what follows, we first provide a short 
overview of the evolving scarcity framings culminating in the current nexus approach 
(Allouche et al., 2015; Andrews-Speed et al., 2012; Foran, 2015; Hoff, 2011). Our 
review of the literature allows us to present a framework of a multi-dimensional 
nexus in which source and sink resources and the natural dynamics underlying 
them interact with techno-economical, socio-political, and market processes. We 
then propound a managerial approach that revolves around dynamism, munificence, 
and complexity which are central constructs in organizational theory (Anderson and 
Tushman, 2001). Building on theoretical insights gathered from prior research on 
organizational ecology and resource dependence theory (Hannan and Freeman, 
1977; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) as well as on current actions of companies to deal 
with nexus problems, we propose complementary strategies that can be used as 
nexus management strategies in a hyper-connected world.  
Framing Scarcity in Time 
 
  Frames are cultural structures that are “produced and shaped by the political 
economy of the society” or through “the deliberate attempt of individuals or groups 
to structure public discourse in a way that privileges their goals and means” (Reese 
et al., 2001, pp., p. 147). As a consequence, frames tend to be in a permanent state 
of emergence or decline while contradicting frames can co-exist peacefully or can be 
involved in an epistemic battle for primacy. The importance of how scarcity is and 
has been framed over the last two centuries can hardly be overestimated. If one were 
to frame global hunger as the inability of the available land to produce enough food 
for a growing population one has to have a radically different conversation than when 
we acknowledge that “per capita calorie production has increased from 2,280 to 
2,800 kcal per day” (Hoff, 2011, p. 7). Knowing that a healthy diet requires on average 
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2,000 kcal per day per person the hunger problem shifts from a productive capacity 
issue (frame 1) to a distribution and justice issue (frame 2).  
Of the three stages involved in addressing any issue (selection, framing, and 
resolution), issue framing has the most profound effect on the final result (Bardwell, 
1991). This is especially so when an issue’s framing affects an open community of 
people who use that framing as a basis for problem solving trajectories. In this 
context, framing can be understood as “a process that can help members of a 
community to evaluate the benefits (“wins”) and drawbacks (“trade-offs”) of a 
potential course of action” (Rice, 2012). The epistemology of framing requires a 
recognition that “any system is subject to multiple forms of interpretation by a range 
of actors dependent upon how scale, boundaries, key elements, dynamics, and 
outcomes are labelled and categorised, and how assumptions are made based on 
varying degrees of subjective/value judgements” (Middleton et al., 2015). 
Failure to ensure effective problem framing and subsequent actions can lead 
to (1) defining a problem such that it cannot be understood by diverse interests, (2) 
defining the problem such that it cannot be solved, (3) solving the wrong problem, 
and (4) a mismatch between problem and solution, e.g. working on a technical 
solution for a problem that, at its core, requires a social or political solution (Clark 
and Stankey, 2006). These points are relevant to the framing of scarcity as they 
crucially affect how management ought to think about coping with scarcity now and 
in the future.  
Scarcity 
Concerns over the availability of natural resources are recorded as far back as 
the biblical Old Testament (Gleick, 2014) and resource scarcity has been on the 
agenda of economists, politicians, and environmentalists for more than a century. 
However, while the word “scarcity” has remained in fashion over time, what it exactly 
refers to has been subject to considerable variation. Malthus (1798) feared 
agricultural land would be incapable of providing enough food for an ever-growing 
population, while Ricardo (1817) stated that scarcity was a function of different 
grades of ore quality that could be extracted at a reasonable cost. This implied a 
transition from the biophysical to the techno-economic as the focal constraint on 
availability. The conservation movement in the early 20th century favoured restraint 
from resource use, calling on our (intertemporal) morality and providing a more social 
mechanism that determines availability. Hotelling (1931) later conceived of an 
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“economics of exhaustible resources” and concluded that scarcity is transparent in 
resource prices hence providing a market rationale for scarcity. 
The rapid growth of the post-war economy sparked doubts as to whether 
market prices were suitable mechanisms to avoid resource exhaustion. Tober (1974, 
in Brown and Field, 1978) for instance submitted that prices of wild pigeons 
remained very stable until their complete extinction in 1890 and social psychologists 
have come to find that people have a strong tendency to overconsume physical, 
spatial, and temporal resources (Herlocker et al., 1997), with the Easter Island as 
the prototypical example. Such notions were exacerbated by the rise of the 
environmental movement which exposed the links between environmental damage 
and industrial or agricultural processes which lead to the realization that ecosystem 
constraints could limit the productive capacity of the land (Carson, 2002), which in 
turn provided the feeding ground for the environmental movement (Grisworld, 2012). 
Later, the seminal “Limits to Growth” foresaw economic collapse due to food 
and mineral shortages (Brundtland and WCED, 1987), thus echoing Malthus, while 
the follow-up in 1992 emphasised the impact of resource exploitation on ecosystems 
again. The last two decades have chiefly focused on these ecosystem implications 
with climate change and global warming becoming an integral part of the resource 
constraints agenda. Specifically, the Carbon Tracker has argued that many fossil fuel 
assets will never be allowed to be mined if governments indeed are willing to enforce 
the 2 degrees centigrade target that has been agreed in the UNFCCC COP process 
which in turn has been stretched to 1.5 in Paris in 2015 (Leaton et al., 2013; 
UNFCCC, 2015), hence providing a political constraint on resource availability. 
Similarly, the modern discourse on resource security is also related to both social 
and political constraints imposed on natural resources through quota and strategic 
state interventions (Buijs and Sievers, 2012; Defra, 2011). Finally, the discourse on 
planetary boundaries has promoted the idea of nine essential ecosystems that each 
are sensitive to transgression of their capacity to absorb negative externalities 
(Rockström et al., 2009). While the planetary boundaries hypothesis has been built 
on the narrative of “how many planets do we need to sustain our current 
consumption”, it has failed to answer how the interconnections between the affected 
ecosystems could create irreversible thresholds. Specifically this omission is being 
addressed by the resource nexus concept, the latest discursive step in our 
understanding of scarcity which incorporates system emergent properties between 
resource systems and therefore uncertainty in system behaviour. This discursive 
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evolution shows that scarcity has been iteratively framed as being chiefly driven by 
biophysical, techno-economic, market, socio-political, and eco-system constraints. 
Nexus Thinking 
Nexus has been described as “the new kid on the block” in recent resource 
debates. However, the first real mention of the food-energy nexus dates back to a 
1983 program of the United Nations University (Scott et al., 2015) and nexus 
thinking itself is rooted in both input-output analysis and the systems thinking 
behind the foundational “Limits to Growth” (Meadows et al., 1972). Yet the modern 
nexus discourse really only dates back to the beginning of the 21st century with early 
studies mainly focusing on the link between water and energy generation. Chiefly 
since the global food crisis in 2008, the nexus debate has started to broaden its 
horizons by considering more than two natural resource systems concurrently. Now, 
the nexus commonly refers to the explicit interlinkages between water, energy, food 
(the so-called WEF agenda), and to a lesser extent climate change and land (Allouche 
et al., 2015; Foran, 2015). The key characteristic of the water-energy-food nexus is 
that each of these three elements require the other two as inputs. Since 2010, nexus 
issues have been raised by governmental organizations such as the UN General 
Assembly, the European Commission on Development, World Bank, the Global Water 
Partnership, and the US National Intelligence Council.  
While the nexus frame can be understood as a rebranding of much thinking 
about sustainable development, the green economy, resource scarcity and 
environmental justice, in its simplest form it refers to “an approach that integrates 
management and governance across sectors and scales” (Hoff, 2011, p. 7). As much 
of the nexus work has been conducted with a background in water research, some 
others have voiced concerns, stating that the nexus approach “leads to demand-led 
technological and market solutions that ignore the supply-side limits and political 
dimensions in terms of control over and access to resources” (Allouche et al., 2015, 
p. 611). These authors argue that nexus research has focused primarily on 
establishing the biophysical interdependence between water, energy, and food (and 
land) while ignoring that the production and use of these resources are very often 
political actions and thus constrained in terms of who can obtain resources and at 
what price. In a similar vein, Middleton et al. (2015, p. 630) have sought to establish 
that “the nexus is a political process, not just a technical one”.  
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Beyond the natural and political frames, Andrews-Speed et al. (2012, p.5) 
argue the resource nexus “comprises the numerous linkages between different 
natural resources and raw materials that arise from economic, political, social, and 
natural processes”. Others attempt to further broaden the boundaries and 
usefulness of the nexus by infusing it with concepts such as environmental justice 
(Middleton et al., 2015), resource inequality and social instability (Allouche et al., 
2015), regimes of provisioning (Foran, 2015), and networks of action (Villamayor-
Tomas et al., 2015). At the opposite end of the spectrum, Scott et al. (2015, p. 20) 
seek to narrow down the application of the nexus approach by zooming in on how it 
forces us to think about resource recovery in a more systemic way. Hoff (2011, p. 7) 
described the objective of nexus thinking as “a reduction of negative economic, social 
and environmental externalities [that] can increase overall resource use efficiency, 
provide additional benefits and secure the human rights to water and food”. Perhaps 
because the nexus framing is still in flux, Middleton et al (2015) have proposed that 
the nexus has taken on the characteristics of a nirvana concept as it embodies an 
ideal image of a normative world view to which society should aspire.  
Scarcity in the Resource Nexus 
When it comes to framing scarcity in the resource nexus, there is broad 
agreement about the causal attributions that make the present frame distinct from 
past frames. First, the doubling of the world economy between 1998 and 2008 in 
PPP, population and middle class growth with changing energy and food preferences, 
and increasing urbanization are vital demographic and economic factors that strain 
natural resource systems. Second, global trade rose from $5.5 trillion to $16 trillion 
in the same 10 year period increasing the interconnectedness of the economy and 
the increasing adoption of Western lifestyles. The traded percentage of food produced 
has increased from 10 to 15% between 1970 and 2000. Although the financial and 
food crises of 2008 have pushed down the growth of global trade from about 7% per 
annum between 1960 and 2008 to below 3.5% since, globalization might be slowing 
down, but is not retracting (Wolf, 2016). Thus, disturbances and shocks in markets 
are now globally contagious. But, limiting global trade and promoting protectionist 
isolationism will worsen local shortages, especially in import-dependent, 
underdeveloped nations. 
Global drivers can become more important than local drivers while, at the 
same time, increasing connectivity enables local turbulence to spread further and 
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faster than ever before (Andrews-Speed et al., 2012). This lead Sir Martin Sorrell, 
CEO of WPP, to say that in this era of hyper-connectivity, companies must treat even 
small problems as company-wide reputational threats and “prepare global responses 
to local crises” (Xynteo, 2012, p. 12). This business need is only exacerbated by new 
technologies and social networks allow proliferation of un-validated information 
while also enabling better monitoring and stronger social movements. On top of that, 
at the political level, there has been an increase in terra-complexity, characterized 
by a reduction of US power, the emergence of the G20 from the G7, the rise of 
populism and nationalism, and the rapid ascent of public, private and state-owned 
firms as key actors in solving social issues. 
Against this background, Andrews-Speed et al. (2012, p. 3) postulated that 
the focal challenge is “to govern resources across countries and companies within 
the absorptive capacity of the planet”, hence focusing on natural ecosystem 
limitations. Others have suggested that “while water, energy and food security have 
so far been mainly constrained by unequal access, humanity is now also approaching 
limits in global resource availability and sink strength” (Hoff, 2011, p. 11). Although 
others have suggested that actual constraints on biophysical availability are much 
less restrictive than once imagined, there is nonetheless broad agreement that 
“whether or not resources are actually running out, the outlook is one of supply 
disruptions, volatile prices, accelerated environmental degradation and rising 
political tensions over resource access” (Lee et al., 2012, p. xi) 
Towards a New Framing 
Foran (2015) suggested that the nexus is still an immature concept that is in need 
of more critical conceptualization. In this light, Villamayor-Tomas et al. (2015) point 
out that most nexus approaches are rooted in systems thinking which focuses on 
the natural interactions while downplaying the vital role of private supply chains, 
human agency, and political institutions. Foran (2015) suggests that a combination 
of systems complexity thinking that asks how do efforts for domain A affect other 
variables of interest in domains A, B, C, D with a more critical social science 
approach that investigates historical power relations and their relationship to poverty, 
is required to bolster understanding. Relatedly, Andrews-Speed et al. (2012) suggest 
scarcity is a multi-dimensional concept and that the nexus approach “stems from 
the geo-chemical-ecologic conditions as well as from their socio-technological-
economic-political contexts” (p. 6). 
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Extending this line of reasoning we propose a nexus frame to natural resource 
scarcity that departs from the interplay between source and sink resources. Source 
resources capture the biophysical availability of known and unknown reserves of 
natural resources on which human production and consumption activities depend. 
Sink resources are the different natural and social ecosystems and biomes upon 
which the planet relies to store, assimilate, and/or transform waste pollutants and 
contaminants originating from human production and consumption activities. Sink 
resources thus determine the earth’s capacity to deal with the negative externalities 
caused by exploitation of source resources and potentially (if negative feedback loops 
come into play) also by the further deterioration of other sinks. In conjunction with 
this framing of resource scarcity around sources and sinks, we propose three 
dimensions that are essential constraints to resource availability in the 
Anthropocene. 
The techno-economic dimension determines which forms of resource extraction 
are technologically feasible, economically efficient, and which externalities are 
associated with the required industrial processes to turn a resource into a useful 
input. Breakthrough technologies can enable cheaper extraction or bring previously 
inaccessible source resources within the economic fold and can hence increase the 
known and accessible stock of resources, though often at a price: Energy return on 
investment has been falling in most places in recent decades as the low hanging 
fruits are increasingly behind us (Hall et al., 2014). Digging in more challenging 
natural environments such as the Arctic and in deep waters poses grave 
environmental risks as the Deepwater Horizon disaster made clear. The development 
of new natural energy resources like oil and tar sands and shale oil and shale gas is 
associated with lower energy return on investment as well as significant damage to 
sinks (Hughes, 2013; Yaritani and Matsushima, 2014). The same goes for deep 
exploration projects such as the copper mining project Resolution in the USA which 
cost billions before any return is expected (Phillips (Phillips, 2016), while other 
mining projects’ failures such as the Samarco Tailings Dam breach could top the 
Deepwater disaster as the most expensive environmental catastrophe ever (Frik, 
2016).  
The market dimension captures the allocation of capital and skills to specific 
ends, distribution processes, and an incentive system that values natural resources 
in monetary terms, thereby enabling trade. Most sink resources are not valued in the 
market as no clear property rights are assigned to them or fail to be enforced. Opaque 
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markets - in which transparency is low - heighten scarcity while leakage in 
distribution systems adds a layer of waste as well. Despite decades of economic 
research, there is still no agreement as to whether scarcity is transparent in market 
prices (Hotelling, 1931; McMahon and Mrozek, 1997; Norgaard, 1990). Moreover, 
natural resource economists have argued that those firms that base strategic 
decisions based on actual price movements will inevitably be too late to implement 
meaningful change (Alonso et al., 2007). Schillebeeckx and George (2016) summarize 
that four reasons coexist to explain why temporary imbalances in these natural 
resource markets are likely: (1) the capital intensive nature of most commodity value 
chains; (2) poor price signal generation due to corporate reserve commercial 
sensitivity and limited time horizon of exploration; (3) up-, mid-, or down- stream 
concentration in the value chain creating power differentials which also reduces 
transparency; and (4) the geological co-dependencies between different resources 
The socio-political dimension ought to provide a counterweight to the market 
while at the same time steering the direction of technological progress. This 
dimension crucially is responsible for exerting care for those resources that escape 
market valuation but are nonetheless of high value to human and planetary survival. 
Social issues such as human health, poverty, and migration influence this dimension 
and further affect the actual availability of resources as governments or civil society 
itself can constrain mining efforts for idiosyncratic reasons. The same goes for the 
rules imposed by government to ensure the industrial system does not excessively 
stress the sinks’ resilience, as they successfully did when enforcing greater fuel 
efficiency in cars after 1978 and as was done with the ban on CFCs to protect the 
Ozone layer, formalized in the Montreal Protocol. In addition, we have to ask under 
which social regimes the nexus elements are produced and how that relates to profit, 
power, and social change (Foran, 2015). The figure below summarizes the framing of 
scarcity in the resource nexus. The plus or minus symbol at the sink level indicates 
whether a sink is made more resilient (+) or less so (-).  
Table 1: A Nexus Frame for Resource Scarcity 
  
Constraints on Resource Availability 
 Techno-
economic 
Market Socio-Political 
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Source 
EROI, extraction 
technology, cost,  
exploration 
Price, supply 
elasticity, 
concentration, 
interdependence, 
imbalances 
Global trade, resource 
nationalism, social 
equity, indigenous 
rights, regulation 
Sink 
Externalities (-) 
Geo-engineering 
(+), planetary 
thresholds (-) 
Tragedy of the 
commons (-), 
internalization (+), 
property rights (+) 
Health (-), poverty (-/+), 
conflict (-), social action 
(+), migration, carbon 
tax (+) 
 
It is important to note that this frame presumes a holistic perspective. It does not 
explicitly account for interests and strategic or political choices taken by the focal 
actors who can choose to ignore certain aspects of the frame or color them in 
differently based on their idiosyncratic position that drives them to ignore and 
reshape certain aspects. As such, this frame interacts with scale perspectives (global, 
national, regional, local), and with role perspectives (government v corporation v NGO 
v individual). National governments e.g. will focus on endowments or lack thereof 
and policy will be determined by the relative ease by which critical resources can be 
acquired. Land acquisitions by governments and sovereign wealth funds have made 
clear that for vital resources such as food, some governments lack faith in market-
based allocation mechanisms. In what follows, we take the perspective of the 
corporation that operates within an environment characterized by the resource 
nexus. 
The Resource Nexus as Environment 
“Until recently, the planet was a large world in which human activities and their effects 
were neatly compartmentalized within nations, within sectors (energy, agriculture, 
trade), and within broad areas of concern (environment, economics, social). The 
compartments have begun to dissolve. This applies in particular to the various global 
‘crises’ that have seized public concern, particularly over the past decade. These are 
not separate crises: an environmental crisis, a development crisis, an energy crisis. 
They are all one.” 
Perhaps surprisingly, this quote dates back over 30 years (Brundtland and WCED, 
1987). Since then these trends have only magnified. The deep interdependence 
among natural source resources and the techno-economic, market, and socio-
political systems that have been built within our increasingly fragile (sink) 
ecosystems, creates significant challenges for organizations that operate within the 
resource nexus (Allouche et al., 2015). Jeremy Oppenheim, director of McKinsey & 
Company’s Sustainability and Resource Productivity Practice stated that “the world 
is heading for an era of much higher, more volatile resource prices and much greater 
correlation across systems that used to be separate from each other” (Xynteo, 2012, 
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p. 13). While the higher prices are currently not materializing, the correlation across 
systems surely remains a focal challenge due to the volatility that precipitates. 
In this context, we revisit the familiar terminology of dynamism, complexity, 
and munificence to describe the environment. While these familiar concepts are 
ordinarily captured by industry characteristics (volatility, concentration, growth), our 
framing significantly expands their usefulness by explicitly thinking about the 
meaning of dynamism, complexity, and munificence in the context of not only market, 
but also source and sink resources, and the techno-economic and socio-political 
dimensions. Table 2 provides a synoptic overview.  
McArthur and Nystrom (1991) explain that dynamism pertains to the degree 
of market instability over time and turbulence caused by interconnectedness 
between organizations. More generally, dynamism refers to change that is hard to 
predict and that heightens uncertainty (Dess and Beard, 1984). Environmental 
dynamism is in most empirical research related to the unpredictability of demand, 
while unpredictability of competitor action, government action, or even technological 
evolution are less pronounced. Anderson and Tushman say that organizational 
environments “consist of inter-organizational niches, institutional factors and intra-
industry structures” but are silent about the natural environment (2001, p. 703). Lee 
et al. (2012) speak of the “age of interdependence”, while Scott et al. (2015, p. 23) 
suggest that uncertainty associated with dynamism can be attenuated by better 
understanding the “inter-dependence and inter-connectedness of social and bio-
physical systems”. 
Uncertainty exists at the techno-economic level about which technologies will 
be economically viable and ecologically sustainable, while at the same time we need 
to consider whether viable extraction locations will be socio-politically acceptable. 
Such notions of dynamism and uncertainty typically remain out of the purview of 
management scholars or when they are considered they are presumed to have similar 
effects. Yet most of the strategies typically associated with dynamic (or complex) 
environments are meant to increase control over specific actors. Such dyadic actor-
actor strategies are not very effective in dealing with events that transcend human 
agency. Specifically at the sink level, force majeure and the lack of deep 
understanding of how ecosystems interact and are affected by externalities such as 
greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere add to the uncertainty for organizational 
decision-makers. The truth of the matter is that even after decades of research, at 
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this stage we still know quite little about how transgressions of “planetary boundaries” 
will affect other planet-wide ecosystems.  
Complexity describes the degree of heterogeneity and the dispersion of 
organizational activities and is commonly captured by various concentration 
measures or specialization of product lines (McArthur and Nystrom, 1991). An 
organization’s environment is more complex to the extent that it must keep track of 
heterogeneous actors which have a range of activities, linkages, and interactions 
outside its boundaries (Dess & Beard, 1984; Anderson & Tushman, 2001). The nexus 
brings many more heterogeneous actors that rely on and activities that require the 
same natural resources, into the fold which makes monitoring significantly more 
challenging. Complexity is also evident in the existence of the different dimensions 
of scarcity. Allouche et al. (2015, p. 616) pointed out that “what could be seen as an 
international political economy issue linked to unequal access has been framed as 
having an economic and technological solution”. Others fear the likelihood of 
emergent resource-driven conflicts which could “escalate into socio-economic 
breakdowns with subsequent interruptions of supply chains for materials”, 
especially in fragile states (Bleischwitz et al., 2014, p. 11).  
At the socio-political level, Scott et al. (2015) state that complexity is evident 
in rules of use: 1) allocation rules determine criteria to allocate water for industry, 
irrigation, and water supply, 2) coordination rules define distribution criteria for 
funding and monitoring quality standards, 3) equity rules are norms about fair 
distribution (of NR, grants) between rural and urban communities, and 4) 
organizational rules are the formal rules in the public sector and are indicative of 
discretion allowed by distinct departments. Yet Sir David King argues that “the 
organization of governments into ministries and universities into departments 
perpetuates siloed thinking” such that more holistic nexus approaches are unlikely 
(Xynteo, 2012, p. 22). Finally, sink complexity is evident in our lack of knowledge 
about the importance of the distinct elements that make up a sink and critically 
influence its essential ecosystem functions, while monitoring ecosystem evolution 
and gathering data that are both reliable and affordable add another layer of 
complexity.   
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Table 2: The Nexus Environment 
 Nexus Dynamism Nexus Complexity Nexus Munificence 
Source NR Nexus is unstable 
and unpredictable 
due to NR 
interdependence 
Quantity of NR in the 
nexus, multi-functionality 
of NR, high monitoring 
costs 
Actual NR stocks are 
unknown and known 
reserves are often 
private information/ 
Techno-
economic 
Uncertainty as to 
which technologies 
will be feasible and 
sustainable  
Heterogeneity and the 
dispersion of 
organizations’ activities 
New technology can 
make NR accessible at 
acceptable economic 
cost 
Market Instability due to 
organizational 
interdependence, 
variable demand 
growth 
Heterogeneous 
competition in NR 
markets, concentration of 
inputs  
Hidden stocks 
suggest scarcity is not 
transparent in prices 
Socio-
political 
Political co-
dependence to make 
transnational 
decisions re NR 
Allocation, coordination, 
equity, and organizational 
rules 
Local and global 
sufficiency are 
distinct problems, 
conflicts can emerge 
Sink NR Force Majeure, NR 
nexus 
interdependence  
Importance of distinct 
elements, ecosystem 
functions, and monitoring 
difficulties 
Evolving capacity of 
biomes to absorb 
externalities affects 
growth potential 
   
 Finally, munificence typically refers to the capacity of an environment to 
support growth (Dess and Beard, 1984) and is commonly measured by growth of 
sales, employment, price-cost margin and so on (McArthur and Nystrom, 1991). At 
the source level, “scarcity cannot be measured objectively” (Andrews-Speed et al., 
2012, p. 4). This explains why the 2012 WEF survey reported resource scarcity as 
the trend which courted the most controversy in terms of the extent to which it 
represented an over- or under-estimation in public perception. Predictions on the 
availability of some source resources sometimes vary by an order of magnitude (e.g. 
phosphorous: from 40 to 300-400 years (Grantham, 2012). Reports published 
between 2008 and 2013 share the perspective that demand growth for major 
resources would continually rise in the next few decades (e.g. Lee et al., 2012) but 
the slowdown of the Chinese economy has depressed both prices and demand. Thus, 
even industry experts are largely unable to correctly assess demand growth and 
possible scarcity in the short run (while long term trends might arguably be better 
predicted). This essentially means that an assessment of past munificence provides 
a very poor indication of future munificence and confirms that price movements are 
poor strategy guides (Alonso et al., 2007). This immediately suggests that market 
prices are not very reliable indicators of actual scarcity (Norgaard, 1990). 
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At the techno-economic level, munificence is determined by the ability of 
current and new technologies to extract source resources at an economically 
affordable price. Socio-politically, the issue of localness versus globalness plays a 
critical part in understanding munificence. While a source resource may be plentiful 
in one region, shortages elsewhere may appear. Six of the nine named planetary 
boundaries are aggregates from local data, and these aggregates could obfuscate 
regional abundance and scarcity (Rockström et al., 2009). E.g. African v American 
farming is very different so that ‘glocal policies’ around nitrogen, potash, and 
especially phosphorous are needed. While a global approach to managing the 
availability of especially phosphorous would be beneficial, the local implementation 
should lead to restraint in the USA and heavier use in Africa. Finally, the capacity of 
sink resources to sustain growth and further industrialization is under threat, 
especially when it comes to greenhouse gasses’ effects on the climate (IPCC, 2014).  
The interaction of these three environmental conditions creates a situation in 
which uncertainty is pervasive. The reality of the situation is such that the ever 
growing complexity of natural resource systems has largely outpaced our ability to 
exert control over them. As a result, although source resources balance at an 
aggregate supply and demand level, individual cases of resource scarcity are 
inevitable in temporally and spatially discrete contexts. Additionally, the effects on 
sink resources are quite often unpredictable as the below example makes clear. 
Fuel for food: Why nexus challenges appear beyond (managerial) control  
International policy creates heterogeneous competition for land and allocation 
uncertainty 
The introduction of the biofuel mandates regarding the transportation fuel mix in the 
EU and the US has as a primary objective to reduce reliance on fossil fuels, both for 
strategic and environmental reasons. This firmly established a linkage between the 
food and the energy resource systems (with their own frames). The IEA requirements 
to ramp up biofuel production clashed with FAO’s need for feed stock production on 
the supply side, creating a shortage of suitable soil with multiple effects. 
Demographic shifts create price spikes and social unrest 
This coincided with the increase in wealth of the BRIC countries during the previous 
decade which resulted in greater consumption of grain-fed dairy products, especially 
meat. Note that 47% of US land is used for agriculture, 70% of which is used to raise 
cattle (mainly cows) and grow the crops that these animals eat. Less than 1% is 
actually used to grow fruit, vegetables, and nuts for human consumption (DiCaprio, 
2016). Reduced food reserves and the additional demand for feed-stocks to satisfy 
biofuel targets, changed the behaviour of global food markets which culminated in 
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the food price spike in 2008, i.e. doubling of maize, rapeseed and soybeans, tripling 
of wheat and quintupling of rice prices. It was claimed that the biofuel mandates 
resulted in food shortages and pushed between 30 to 100 M people into poverty with 
food riots reported in Haiti, Egypt and Bangladesh. This was despite the drivers for 
the event originating in seemingly unconnected regions. 
Turning sink into source resources creates possible negative-sum trade-offs 
The Indirect Land Use Change (iLUC) debate focuses on how land that was previously 
designated as pure sink resource (biodiversity, carbon storage in forests), is 
converted into productive food crop land because former food crop land is being 
diverted to grow energy crops. This results in reduced feedstock availability and an 
increase in the price of food commodities (substitution risk).  
Where bioenergy cropping occurs on land previously used for food, feed or fibre 
production, it displaces the previous production of food, feed or fibre. As demand for 
displaced production remains, it must be produced elsewhere, which might result in 
converting other land (and releasing carbon emissions) to produce the requisite 
amounts of food, feed, or fibre. These emissions from indirect land use changes are 
effectively caused by bio-energy production displacing food production and can, in 
the net balance, negate any positive effects of replacing fossil fuels. Carbon stocks in 
the top metre of wetlands stand at 679 tC / ha and forest 151 to 404 tC/ha– a 
substantial proportion of which stands to be released if converted for cultivation.  
Additionally, the expansion of land for agricultural food commodities and bio-energy 
feed-stocks results in the loss of ecosystem and biodiversity services and carbon 
sinks. For instance, during the forest fires in Indonesia, lit to facilitate the further 
expansion of palm oil production, the fires alone push as much CO2 in the 
atmosphere as the entire USA. They also virtually destroyed the last place on earth 
where tigers, elephants, rhinos and orang-utans cohabited in the wild (DiCaprio, 
2016). Many of the biomass assessments propose replacing land with plantations for 
forest growth, yet these typically do not have the same biodiversity and carbon 
storage benefits as primary land.  Reduced biodiversity is also considered to impact 
on ecosystem resilience, i.e. the ability for ecosystems to resist environmental 
pressures. It is thought that lower biodiversity leads to increased likelihood of abrupt 
shifts in ecosystem states - though the relationship is not yet clearly understood.   
Managing the Nexus  
“Effectively and efficiently managing resources within a firm’s given 
environmental context, ultimately determines the amount of value the firm generates 
and maintains” (Sirmon et al., 2007, p. 274). As such it is no surprise that an 
increase in uncertainty regarding critical resources is accompanied by higher 
organizational exit rates (Anderson and Tushman, 2001). Thus, resource-related 
uncertainty will make it harder for a manager to steer their organization in the right 
direction.  
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A primary concern for managers operating in the resource nexus is decision 
response uncertainty, which can be understood as the inability to predict how a 
chosen response will affect the nexus (Miller and Shamsie, 1999; Milliken, 1987). 
Given the lack of scientific knowledge about the exact interdependencies among 
various natural source resources, their extraction, and sink resources, decision 
response uncertainty is less an idiosyncratic issue of decision-maker ignorance than 
one of genuine unknowns. One normative solution would be for managers to abide 
by the precautionary principles and not engage in actions that might cause 
environmental harm unless if they prove that no harm can be reasonably expected. 
While this approach is often favored by environmentalists, it might impose undue 
limitations on innovation and leave local entrepreneurs that are working in difficult 
natural ecosystems with not much alternatives. Perhaps a better strategy is one of 
small scale experimentation with close measuring of the potential negative 
externalities. The risk of such an approach is that externalities emerge in a non-
linear way, in that they can remain rather insignificant until a threshold is passed 
after which they become irreversible.  
A secondary problem is that even if we had perfect information into how a 
specific intervention would affect associated ecosystems in the nexus, it is unlikely 
that many Pareto improvements are easily available. Given that many choices are 
likely to be associated with damage done to either a human minority or to fauna and 
flora, the absence of “uncontested actions” requires either a negotiation between the 
powerful actor and the relevant stakeholders, which risks perpetuating power 
divisions and social inequality, or a dominant, yet unenforceable normative morality 
(see also Foran, 2015). Given that such a morality is unlikely to be shared by different 
interest groups, the nexus concept is susceptible to disregarding the powerless in 
favor of the powerful. While this could be a preferred strategy from a corporate 
perspective, it risks alienating societal stakeholders and can as such cause social 
disruption if stakeholder’s needs become more urgent and find a way to seize more 
power (Mitchell et al., 1997). How should corporate decision-makers then deal with 
the problems imposed by the resource nexus, i.e. how to operate in an environment 
characterized by high complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity? While the empirical 
evidence on corporate responses to the resource nexus is slim, we present three 
largely complementary strategies that provide ways to manage uncertainty in 
dynamic, complex, and non-munificent natural resource environments. 
 17 
 
 
Developing Anti-Fragility 
Already from the late eighties, firms and scholars have worried about how to 
integrate organization-centric strategic planning and environment-centric issue 
management (Camillus and Datta, 1991). Yet how managers are expected to cope 
with an issue as complex as the resource nexus has largely escaped scholarly 
attention. In his 2012 book, Nassim Taleb defines antifragility as the capacity to gain 
from disorder, randomness, stressors, or uncertainty. He suggests that every organic 
system needs some exposure to external variability else its immunity is weakened. 
For organizations we can think about anti-fragility as the ability to outperform rivals 
in uncertain environments characterized by high dynamism and complexity, and low 
munificence. Note that this is difference from resilience which can be understood as 
a measure of: (a) how much change a system can undergo while retaining the same 
control and returning to its original state, (b) the self-organizing capacity of the 
system, and (c) the learning and adaptive ability of a system (Scott et al., 2015). While 
a resilient firm may thus weather the storm, an antifragile one will become better 
after the storm than it was before.  
Some of the key strategies Taleb (2012) advocates are tinkering or bricolage, 
failing fast with small losses and using heuristics over theory. These reflect an 
entrepreneurial risk-seeking attitude. Relatedly, Boisot and Child (1999) have 
suggested that firms in highly uncertain environments should absorb complexity by 
developing structural variety, fostering interpersonal connectivity, and pursuing 
multiple, even contradictory, goals and strategies hence generating behavioral 
plasticity. One way of doing this is by considering both internal and external 
stakeholder perspectives which helps decision-makers shield from overly simplistic 
interpretations of the environment (Ashmos et al., 2000). On top of that decentralized 
decision-making has also been found to be conducive to adapting to environmental 
complexity. Newtonian organizations tend to reduce complexity instead of absorbing 
it and are characterized by clear lines of authority, predefined roles and 
accountabilities, and if-then incentive structures are less likely to cope well in 
uncertain environments such as the resource nexus.  (Ashmos et al., 2000).  
In organizational ecology, generalists have higher likelihood of survival than 
specialists in fluctuating environments and the reverse is true when the environment 
is relatively stable (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). While specialization generally leads 
to efficiency gains, firms operating in the resource nexus face both high demand and 
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supply volatility, as well as an insecure regulatory framework and increasingly 
pressing sink resource limitations. Especially in uncertain environments with low 
munificence, resources as real options might provide firms with necessary 
capabilities to act quickly to opportunities and threats. In these environments 
developing resources internally is recommended while divesting is considered to be 
risky (Sirmon et al., 2007).  
Innovation: Boosting Flexibility 
Ahmed et al. (1996, p. 562) stated that in the coming decades “flexibility and 
responsiveness built upon a solid foundation of product quality, performance, 
reliability, service, and cost offer promise as platforms of competitive advantage”. 
Firms active in the resource nexus will have to imbricate these dynamic capabilities 
with their core competences as companies like H&M and Zara have successfully done 
in response to more volatile consumer preferences. Yet, increasingly short lead times 
and just-in-time delivery systems are notoriously fragile as even minor shocks in the 
supply network can have wide-ranging ripple effects (Cobb, 2013). To prevent these 
negative shockwaves, functional redundancy - what Taleb calls “degeneracy” – needs 
to be built into supply networks so that multiple suppliers can flexibly meet the 
requirements if one fails. In the resource nexus, this means geographically and 
organizationally diverse supply networks that are unlikely to be exposed to the same 
natural environmental effects (disasters) at the same time.  
When it comes to product design, flexibility requires the ability to adapt either 
the input or the timing of the input acquisition decision in response to nexus issues. 
During the period of rare earth shortages and steep price spikes (Hayes-Labruto et 
al., 2013), Vestas altered it wind turbine design to enable it to postpone the purchase 
of dysprosium until the very last minute. This allowed the company to find out if 
prices would drop. The design was changed in such a way that in case prices 
remained prohibitively high, an alternative system that did not require the scarce 
resource could be deployed as well (personal communications). While such design 
choices lowered operational efficiency, they were considered the lesser of two evils in 
volatile and opaque natural resource markets.  
Another piece of the puzzle relates not to the design itself but to how design 
changes can affect the markets for disposal. Gavin Neath from Unilever cautioned 
that “technology itself is often not enough. The behaviour change piece can be harder, 
and a lot more expensive” (Xynteo, 2012, p. 19). This realization suggests that 
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organizations in the resource nexus need to spend extra effort streamlining 
operations in such a way that sales, marketing, design, logistics, and purchasing 
collaborate effectively and efficiently. On top of that, departments such as finance 
and legal, which often stay siloed in organizational structure, should be included in 
cross-departmental teams to better manage the environmental uncertainty. For 
instance, Dreyer and Grønhaug (2012) show that input, production, and financial 
flexibility all contribute to the likelihood of survival in a longitudinal study of the 
Norwegian fishing industry. Similarly, White and Hanmer-Lloyd (1999) argued that 
for purchasing departments to live up to their strategic potential, the CEO needs to 
be actively involved because competitiveness in output markets increasingly relies 
on the firm’s ability to behave more flexible than its competitors in input markets. 
Openness and Collective Action 
 One of the most fundamental things organizations involved in the resource 
nexus can do for their survival and success is to recognize their own limitations when 
it comes to tackling the challenge at hand. We submit that nexus problems are often 
too “wicked” to be solved by a single actor because they transcend the core 
capabilities of any single actor. Almost 30 years ago, Carney (1987, p. 341) stipulated 
that “collective action is a necessary response to environmental turbulence” and 
seldom has this rung more true than when it comes to the resource nexus. Looking 
at the problem of water scarcity in developing nations, the Asian Development Bank 
has stated improving the supply side infrastructure, addressing demand-side factors 
including water pricing, strengthening governance, and building new institutions 
(ADB, 2013, p. vi-vii) are all required to generate credible solutions. No single 
organization has the core competence to do all these things at once and thus 
symbiotic collective action is required. As a form of communal adaptation, symbiosis 
captures the agreements between actors of different types that “make dissimilar 
demands on the environment… [and as such] may supplement the efforts of one 
another” (Astley and Fombrun, 1983, p. 573).  
Additionally, commensalism is a form of communal adaptation that arises 
between similar actors that make overlapping and competitive demands on the 
environment (Astley and Fombrun, 1983). While commensalism can be frowned upon 
from an anti-trust perspective, it is good to remember that the word competition hails 
from the Latin ‘competare’ which originally means, ‘to get fit at the same time’. To 
deal with the negative externalities of mining oil sands, Shell and six other large oil 
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sand minders set up the “Oil Sands Tailing Consortium” that promotes and shares 
research on reducing water usage and lowering the risks of land and water 
contamination. Peter Voser, Shell’s CEO said that “we need understanding beyond 
our own areas. Collaboration is critical to getting action across the stress nexus” 
(Xynteo, 2012, p. 33). Both forms of communal adaptation require a certain openness 
that might not come easily to many corporations. Yet Scott et al. suggest that 
“systems that respond effectively to uncertainty are usually supported by flows of 
information on biophysical and institutional processes” (2015, p. 24). 
 At a very practical level, collaboration between governments, companies, 
NGOs, and communities is required to improve the data availability on natural 
resources. Many natural resource markets remain opaque which makes accurate 
predictions of future global supply and local areas where shortages could appear very 
difficult. Bleischwitz et al. (2014) and conclude that one necessary way forward is 
the establishment of an international data hub on the global resource nexus. Such 
a datahub should merry the corporate desire for maintaining secrecy regarding their 
most valuable assets with the political and societal necessity of knowing (national 
and ideally local) aggregate quantities. Modern cryptography and secure online 
storage can play a role in this collective knowledge challenge.  
Lead by Example 
The Novelis case provides a great example of an organization that is working 
towards reducing its negative impact on all aspects of the resource nexus, by doing 
much of what we suggested above. First, their internal and external organization 
become way more complex since they embarked on their sustainability journey in 
2011. This higher complexity is an absorption response to the increasing 
environmental complexity and thus enhances their anti-fragility. 
In 2005, Novelis was split of of Alcan, creating the first global downstream 
aluminum company without any mining assets (Clinton and March, 2015). By 2011 
the company was under new ownership and management and CEO Phil Martens set 
out to close the aluminum loop, reducing Novelis’ use of virgin aluminum to less 
than 20%. Martens believed that “the challenges associated with global sustainability 
– energy, climate, biodiversity, poverty, and inequality – would soon become central 
to any company’s corporate strategy, especially in material- and energy-intensive 
industries” (Clinton and March, 2015, p. 26). As such, the CEO indicated awareness 
of the resource nexus and the interdependence between different elements that 
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would affect his organization. An ambitious goal of 80% recycled content (up from 
33% in 2011) was set which would require a complete overhaul of product portfolio 
and design, new R&D for a new aluminum alloy, and a change in customer relations 
to ensure end-of-life products returned to the company. Such a radical business 
model innovation requires internal restructuring and streamlining of functions and 
departments in line with new goals and objectives as discussed under “boosting 
flexibility” 
In the process the company made some radical changes such as dropping 
products that required mainly primary aluminum, diversifying the scrap stream, and 
investing heavily in R&D and global recycling capacity. They also left the US National 
Association of Manufacturers to be able to take a more proactive stand on climate 
change. In addition, they actively engaged with policymakers to educate stakeholders 
and build infrastructure for post-consumer recycling, and opened up the supply 
chain by forming “unconventional partnerships with cooperatives, community 
groups and small scrap dealers” (Clinton and March, 2015, p. 28). In response to 
concerns of the three large can makers who feared they would be held hostage by a 
single company providing a closed-loop can, the company “offered to assist other 
companies to certify high-recycled content sheet” to make cans (p. 29). Hence not 
only did they engage in symbiotic and commensalistic relationships with 
unconventional partners and competitors, they also made a stand by leaving other 
relationships that would have held back their ambitions.  
While recycling aluminum is of course easier than recycling complex end-user 
products such as electronics, the example presented here shows how far a company 
can go to achieve sustainability ends. Given the urgency of the problems we are 
facing, especially at the level of the sink resources and their diminishing capacity to 
absorb the externalities caused by industrial production, we sincerely hope that 
many other organizations will follow the Novelis example, and start putting the 
resource nexus at the center of business strategy.   
Conclusion 
With some foresight and political collaboration, mankind need never reach 
absolute scarcity of any source resource assuming developments in technology 
combined with a sufficient supply of energy.  However, such processes are bound by 
the capacity for sink resources to assimilate anthropological waste from economic 
development – and as such these capacities or environmental limits are the true 
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resource constraints of the modern agenda. “Given that the overall costs of inaction 
are generally higher than those of pro-active adaptation” (Hoff, 2011, p. 12), the task 
of business and government in the long run is obvious, yet how we get there is 
significantly less clear. It is paramount that business recognises this collective need 
and play their part, both for their own sake and for the wider community in which 
they operate. 
In this chapter, we presented the resource nexus, the latest frame for scarcity 
thinking. One of the most popular subframes of that frame looks at the nexus from 
a water, energy, and food perspective: “The WEF Nexus, in other words, is a pivotal 
concept for scientific research and a policy tool that allows for operationalization of 
links between sets of two resources (water-food, food-energy, water-energy) building 
up to a triple nexus or triad approach to adaptive management” (Scott et al., 2015, 
p. 33). We have gone a step further by not only looking at the biophysical systems 
that underlie the nexus, but also the human ones. We postulated that the availability 
of natural resources is intrinsically limited by source and sink resource capacities, 
and affected by techno-economic, market, and socio-political realities. In addition, 
we believe that the ever-growing complexity of the modern resource system caused 
by increased resource utilization, physical and operational resource 
interdependencies, coupling of commodity markets globally, and the increased levels 
of world trade is exacerbated by the interactions between environmental sink 
resources. This could lead to thresholds being crossed before we have had the chance 
to develop human systems capable of monitoring and managing environmental 
systems. Arguably, this has already happened.  
So far, these evolutions have outpaced our shared human capacity to 
understand and let alone prevent the great risks associated with greater 
interdependence (the nexus). We can hold out hope for human ingenuity and the 
potential this has to plot the trajectory of the planetary biome in the Anthropocene, 
though a certain level of urgency is needed if the challenges faced are to be prevented 
from becoming crises. As such, there is considerable room for improvement of the 
business-as-usual approach to managing natural resources. We hope this chapter 
and the other ones in this book provide some inspiration for those renegade optimists 
and critical thinkers, to deploy their collective imagination to the most worthy of 
causes. 
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